Showing 1 - 10 of 125
Variations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm have been used and studied extensively in real world markets. Examples include matching medical residents with residency programs, the kidney exchange program and matching college students with on-campus housing. The performance of the Gale-Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626662
Authors of experimental, empirical, theoretical and computational studies of two-sided matching markets have recognized the importance of correlated preferences. We develop a general method for the study of the effect of correlation of preferences on the outcomes generated by two-sided matching...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005838955
Men's and women's preferences are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women who rank them highly. Intercorrelation plays an important but overlooked role in determining outcomes of matching mechanisms. We study via simulation the effect of intercorrelated preferences on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005838976
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312324
Artificial intelligence (AI) developments enable human capability to deliver the same outcome at a lower cost. This research performs a high-level matching between AI solutions and challenges within the port area by developing a novel academic approach. This way, the matching is carried out more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014557515
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385442
Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536989
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537033
We construct a dynamic model of two-sided sorting in labor markets with multi-dimensional agent and firm heterogeneity. We apply it to study optimal party structure and the decision of how (de)centralized candidate recruitment should be. Parties are non-unitary actors and compete at the local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014551584
We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the name but not the type of the other players....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294285