In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition...

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition...

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition...

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction when the bidders that are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition...

This paper considers equilibrium behavior in a descending price auction with two players that are asymmetrically informed. The "informed" player knows his valuation while the other does not. The uninformed player can acquire information about his valuation with a positive cost during the...

We examine bank capital shocks using a recent new approach based on non-normal errors in vector autoregressive models. Using a sample of 14 European economies over January 2004 through March 2018 we identify two distinct classes of bank capital shocks, capital tightening shocks, and bank...