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Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential regulator can in general not mitigate a bank’s failure risk solely by means of liquidity requirements. However, their effectiveness can be restored if, in addition, minimum capital requirements are met. This provides...
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The general view underlying bank regulation is that bank disclosures providemarket discipline and reduce banks’ risk-taking incentives. We show that bankdisclosures can increase bank leverage and bank risk. The reason stems from theinteraction between insured and uninsured debt. Bank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012623643
Can the liquidity risk implied by short-term debt be used to sort insolvent firms out of financial markets? This paper shows that, when asset risk is unobservable, short-term financing may be socially desirable if firms' solvency and liquidity risk are positively correlated. Nonetheless,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013010896
We analyze the problem of a policy authority (PA) that must decide when to resolve a troubled bank whose underlying solvency is uncertain. Delaying resolution increases the chance that information arrives that reveals the bank's true solvency state. However, delaying resolution also gives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013166630
Why do politicians sometimes pursue policies with uncertain outcomes? We present a model in which politicians are unable to pre-commit to a status quo policy, and where investors and voters face a conflict over the division of output. Politicians may deviate from the status quo and pursue risky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315323
We analyze the problem of a policy authority (PA) that must decide when to resolve a troubled bank whose underlying solvency is uncertain. Delaying resolution increases the chance that information arrives that reveals the bank's true solvency state. However, delaying resolution also gives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294456
We analyze the problem of a policy authority (PA) that must decide when to resolve a troubled bank whose underlying solvency is uncertain. Delaying resolution increases the chance that information arrives that reveals the bank's true solvency state. However, delaying resolution also gives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296451