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left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems. -- Unemployment insurance ; retirement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003825176
left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822369
left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more decreasing replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract. It is … show that the unemployment benefit agency could take advantage of the retirement period to tax pensions in order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131149
left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012757644
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702530
We study an individual's incentive to search for a job in the presence of random criminal opportunities. These opportunities extenuate moral hazard, as the individual sometimes commits crime rather than searching. Even when he searches, he applies less effort. We then revisit the design of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380952
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519045
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320121
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750442