In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

We explore the possibility of achieving a cooperative outcome when governments act non-cooperatively in a strategic environmental policy model where emission permit markets are linked. We introduce a specific distribution scheme of the permit revenues between the exporting countries so as to...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting Ã??rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however,...

In this paper, we analyse the effects of a unilateral change in an emissions tax in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms. We find a positive effect of tighter environmental policy on average productivity in the reforming country through reallocation of labour towards exporting...

Policymakers aiming for the unilateral regulation of transboundary pollutants, such as greenhouse gases, fear as a consequence rising emissions in non-regulating countries. This so-called pollution haven or carbon leakage effect is of particular concern in emission-intensive and trade-exposed...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however,...

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however,...