We formulate a three-stage game in which a Japanese firm as a generalized labor-managed firm and an American firm as a profit-maximizing firm compete in the homogeneous product market. In the first stage of the game, both the firms decide whether they enter the market or not. In the second...

We consider the research and development (R&D) investment com petition of duopolistic firms in completely complementary technologies. By "completely complementary technologies," we mean that no firm can produce the goods without both of the technologies. We derive the investments competition...

We consider research and development (R&D) investment competition between duopolistic firms that independently invest in two complementary technologies to produce their products. By "partially complementary technologies", we mean that each firm can produce the goods without both technologies but...

This paper examines how parallel importation influences pharmaceutical innovation and the welfare of the economy, when crossnational drug price differentials occur not only because of demand elasticity based factors, but also governmental drug price control based factors. By explicitly...

We consider an oligopoly with a principal-agent relationship, in which a firm's marginal cost is decreasing in a manager's managerial effort and is subject to an additive uncertainty. Two types of firms operate: one displays symmetric information between the owner and the manager, another...