Some investment advisors offer multiple versions of a fund with the same manager and highlycorrelated returns. But these “twin” funds are separate portfolios for different investors withdiffering abilities to select and monitor managers. Using a matched sample of retail andinstitutional twin...

Some investment advisors offer multiple versions of a fund with the same manager and highly correlated returns. But these twinʺ funds are separate portfolios for different investors with differing abilities to select and monitor managers. Using a matched sample of retail and institutional twin...

We ask whether mutual funds' flows reflect the incentives of the brokers intermediating them. The incentives we address are those revealed in statutory filings: the brokers' shares of sales loads and other revenue, and their affiliation with the fund family. We find significant effects of these...

Studies examine the relation between mutual fund performance and trading cost using a variety of proxies - the most common being portfolio turnover. Overall, the evidence is consistent with informational equilibrium, i.e., trading has zero net impact on performance. We offer an alternative...

Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading,...

We identify an alternative source of ETF shorting related to the market maker liquidity provision and creation/redemption activities. This “operational shorting” arises due to a regulatory exemption, allowing ETF market makers to satisfy excess demand in secondary markets by selling ETF...