rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

constraint in implementation and all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable. In contrast to the …

conditions, e.g., Bayesian monotonicity, are needed to ensure full implementation. We argue that this multiplicity problem is not … very severe for virtual Bayesian implementation. We show that any incentive compatible social choice function is virtually … provide a necessary and sufficient condition – type diversity with respect to deceptions – for virtual Bayesian implementation …

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixedstrategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern … both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity …, mixed Bayesian implementation is equivalent to mixed Bayesian monotonicity, incentive compatibility and closure. For …