We report results from a sender-receiver deception game, which tests whether an individual's decision to deceive is … order to obtain a higher payoff. A sender is positively biased if he thinks that he is higher in the deception distribution … information about the deception of his peers. The experimental data confirm this. We conclude that concern for relative standing …

for personal gain. We further explore the changes in lying and reporting behavior that result from giving individuals a … say in who joins their group. We find that enough individuals are willing to report lies such that in fixed groups lying … generally shunned, even by groups where lying is absent. This facilitates the formation of dishonest groups where lying is …

We report results from a sender-receiver deception game, which tests whether an individual's decision to deceive is … order to obtain a higher payoff. A sender is positively biased if he thinks that he is higher in the deception distribution … information about the deception of his peers. The experimental data confirm this. We conclude that concern for relative standing …

campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model's key predictions, we find in the experiment that …

their suggested actions more frequently with request than intention. We surmise lying aversion plays a prominent role in …