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Symmetric vs. asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery
Engel, Christoph; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Yu, Gaoneng - 2012
symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing … design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially … undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286689
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Symmetric vs. asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery
Engel, Christoph; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Yu, Gaoneng - 2012
symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing … design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially … undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009487845
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Nudging the electorate : what works and why?
Kölle, Felix; Lane, Tom; Nosenzo, Daniele; Starmer, Chris - 2017
Policymakers are increasingly interested these days in how they can achieve desired outcomes using 'nudges' - low-cost and non-obtrusive interventions which rely on psychological mechanisms, rather than high-powered economic incentives, to influence people's behaviour. This paper applies the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660781
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Low-cost interventions to promote voter registration : what works and why?
Kölle, Felix; Lane, Tom; Nosenzo, Daniele; Starmer, Chris - 2017
We report two studies investigating whether, and if so how, different interventions affect voter registration rates. In a natural field experiment conducted before the 2015 UK General Election, we varied messages on a postcard sent by Oxford City Council to unregistered student voters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011770644
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The big carrot: High-stakes incentives revisited
Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - 2009
Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335978
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The big carrot: high stake incentives revisited
Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - 2008
This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268759
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The Big Carrot:High-Stakes Incentives Revisited
Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University - 2009
Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008626035
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The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited
Brañas Garza, Pablo; García Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823002
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The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited
Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2008
This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163433
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Social norms, endogenous sorting and the culture of cooperation
Fehr, Ernst; Williams, Tony - 2018
systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be … preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011825357