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that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and only if her choices reveal that the event is null and the negation of … the event is null. Moreover, I characterize impersonal expected utility that is behaviorally indistinguishable from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282094
observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and only if her choices reveal that the event is null and the negation … of the event is null. Moreover, we characterize impersonal expected utility that is behaviorally indistinguishable from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282109
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584604
I present a general theorem on preference aggregation. This theorem implies, as corollaries, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Wilson's extension of Arrow's to non-Paretian aggregation rules, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and Sen's result on the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. The theorem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584605
Barberà and Coelho (2006) documented six screening rules associated with the rule of k names that are used by different institutions around the world. Here, we study whether these screening rules satisfy stability. A set is said to be a weak Condorcet set la Gehrlein (1985) if no candidate in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584611
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801724