Incentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along two dimensions: controllability and congruence. Most schemes cannot satisfy both criteria at once. EVA bonus schemes, a major managerial innovation of the 90’s, favor the congruence criterion. This paper questions...

We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a convincing...

We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a convincing...

Incentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along two dimensions: controllability and congruence. Most schemes cannot satisfy both criteria at once. EVA bonus schemes, a major managerial innovation of the 90's, favor the congruence criterion. This paper questions ist...

Incentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along two dimensions: controllability and congruence. Most schemes cannot satisfy both criteria at once. EVA bonus schemes, a major managerial innovation of the 90's, favor the congruence criterion. This paper questions ist...

Incentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along two dimensions: controllability and congruence. Most schemes cannot satisfy both criteria at once. EVA bonus schemes, a major managerial innovation of the 90’s, favor the congruence criterion. This paper questions...

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