In firms with concentrated ownership the controlling shareholder may pursue nonmonetary private returns, such as electoral goals in a firm controlled by politicians or family prestige in family firms. We use a simple theoretical model to analyze how this mechanism affects the selection of...

In firms with concentrated ownership the controlling shareholder may pursue nonmonetary private returns, such as electoral goals in a firm controlled by politicians or family prestige in family firms. We use a simple theoretical model to analyze how this mechanism affects the selection of...

We present a model in which the owner of the firm enjoys a private benefit from developing a personal relationship with the executives. This may lead the owner to retain a senior executive in office even though a more productive replacement is available. The model shows that the private returns...

We use matched employer-employees data for Italy to study the joint response of wages and employment to firm-level shocks. We construct a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of labor demand and supply that allows us to identify separately firing (or internal) and mobility (or external)...

We study the role of employment protection legislation (EPL) in determining firm size distribution. In many countries the provisions of EPL are more stringent for firms above certain size thresholds. We construct a simple model that shows that the smooth relation between size and growth...