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It is never too late: Optimal penalty for investment delay in Italian public procurement contracts

D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola; … - 2009

We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor's value of investment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279528

"It Is Never too late": Optimal Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts

Vergalli, Sergio; Chiara D’Alpaos; Moretto, Michele; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987240

Commercial Products and Services : Raising the Market Research Bar or Much Ado about Nothing?

Schooner, Steven L. - 2018

This short piece discusses the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States, No. 17-1465 (Fed. Cir. September, 2018), affirming that “the Army failed to determine whether commercial items meet or could be modified to meet the agency’s needs and that, by failing to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014110283

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019

The government wants an infrastructure-based public service to be provided. First, the infrastructure has to be built; subsequently, it has to be operated. Should the government bundle the building and operating tasks in a public-private partnership? Or should it choose traditional procurement,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015264929

Governing Public-Private Partnerships: The Problem of Low-Cost Decisions

Mause, Karsten - 2019

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015266060

Make or Buy for Public Services: Culture Matters for Efficiency Considerations

Athias, Laure; Wicht, Pascal - 2024

whether the relative cost-efficiency of public versus private provision varies across cultures. We build a representative …, compared to private provision, increases cost- efficiency within French-speaking Swiss municipalities. These results resonate … efficiency is enhanced through mission matching, but they also unveil that this mission matching is culturally determined. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015270951

Assigning tasks in public infrastructure projects: Specialized private agents or public private partnerships?

Morasch, Karl; Tóth, Rita Orsolya - 2008

An welchen Kriterien sollte sich die Entscheidung über die bestmögliche Aufgabenverteilung zwischen staatlichen Stellen und privaten Akteuren bezüglich Finanzierung, Erstellung und Betrieb öffentlicher Infrastruktureinrichtungen orientieren? Während die unmittelbare Erstellung der...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300414

Involvement of small and medium sized enterprises in the private realisation of public buildings

Heinecke, Bastian - 2002

This paper explores the procurement of public buildings in local authorities in the UK under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and its consequences for small and medium sized enterprises. Following an outline of the development of PFI in the UK, the paper explains the peculiarities of local...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305664

Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2013

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015241103

Signaling and contract cost under weak governance: Water service privatization in Metro-Manila, Philippines

Fabella, Raul V. - 2012

Many supply contracts between the state and private agents in a developing country are cost-re-imbursement variety and are rolled out under weak and unreliable governance. The latter has to be provided for through higher supply cost. The state in turn can lower the contract cost by providing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333553