In this paper we generalize the concept of coalitional games by allowing for any organizational structure within coalitions represented by a graphon the set of players ot the coalition. A, possibly empty, set of payoffvectors is assigned to any graph on every subset of players. Such a game will...

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the...

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Durable-strategies Dynamic Games: Theory and Solution Techniques -- Chapter 3. Durable-strategies Dynamic Games of Investments -- Chapter 4. Dynamic Environmental Games: Anthropogenic Eco-degradation under Strategies Lags -- Chapter 5. Durable-strategies...

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...

Theory -- Decision Theory -- Basic Concepts -- Multistage Game -- Repeated Games -- Incomplete Information -- Problems -- Methodology -- Industrial Economics Application Examples -- Public Finance Application Examples -- Military Application Examples -- Miscellaneous Application Examples.