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unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact … attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an … appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030
interpretation that the utility functions of takers are characterized by bounded rationality and the objective of givers is to offer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905908
rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not rationalizable. Second, I apply the maximin expected utility criterion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016
This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325282
I investigate the existence of epistemic models for complete information games that satisfy the following properties: (R) players do not rule out their opponents use rational ex ante strategies for deriving their choices, (K) they do not rule out, ex ante, that they can come to know the action...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707988
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686497
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for some arbitrarily close type. Hence, refinements of rationalizability are not robust. This negative result is obtained … rationalizability when arbitrary common knowledge assumptions are relaxed (i.e., without assuming richness). For arbitrary spaces of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686699
We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383906