For any emission trading system (ETS) with quantity-based endogenous supply of allowances, there exists a negative demand shock, e.g. induced by abatement policy, that increases aggregate supply and thus cumulative emissions. We prove this green paradox for a general model and then apply it to...

Experimental methods have recently been used to evaluate environmental policy instruments, in particular – and most suitably, it seems – emissions trading programs of various designs. Some studies have focused on domestic emissions trading programs, while others have focused on international...

The economic prescription for climate change is clear: price carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions to internalize climate damages. In practice, a variety of political economy constraints prevent the introduction of a carbon price equal to the full social cost of emissions. This...

New York is considering additional emission regulation on top of its obligations under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) to achieve its State Energy Plan targets. The proposed measure is a so-called "carbon adder" on CO2 emissions from the power sector which is set as the difference...

Swiss climate policy consists of three regulatory instruments for greenhouse gas emissions reduction: A CO 2 levy, the Swiss Emissions Trading System (CH EHS), and an additional nonEHS" program for medium-sized plants that consists of command-and-control elements plus a sizeable abatement...

Emission allowances are often distributed for free in an early phase of a cap-and-trade scheme (grandfathering) to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms. If the grandfathering scheme is phased out over time, firms may nevertheless relocate to countries with a lower carbon price...