Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the stability theorem fails for the roommate problem. In this...

We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is also well-known that the number of stable matchings increases with the number of agents on both sides. In this paper, we propose two mechanisms, one of which is a variant of the other, to the...

We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is also well-known that the number of stable matchings increases with the number of agents on both sides. In this paper, we propose two mechanisms, one of which is a variant of the other, to the...

In this paper, we propose a new cycle criterion, Cyclical Conflicts (CCs), for preference profiles in two-sided matching markets through a dynamic mechanism. We first show that CCs provide a complete characterization of singleton cores in two-sided matching markets. Secondly, we prove the...

In this paper, we propose three methods to compare the manipulability degrees of two groups of Social Choice Correspondences (SCCs); the Scoring Rules and the Condorcet rules. We pick one rule from the first group, the Borda rule, and three from the other, the Copeland rule, the Topset and the...

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the stability theorem fails for the roommate problem. In this...

In this paper, we propose two new mechanisms operating in two-sided matching games. The first mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for any preference profile in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The second mechanism, derived from the first, implements a Matryoshka Partition for...