In alternating-offer bargaining, a seller is "stubborn" if she demands the same asking price more than once. We provide empirical evidence on stubbornness and inform the theoretical literature by analyzing millions of eBay bargaining threads taken from Backus et al. (2020). Focusing on the best...

Participants in an innovation contest may steal their opponents’ ideas to enhance their chance of winning. To model this, I introduce the ability to copy another player’s effort in a Tullock contest between two players. I characterise the unique equilibrium in this game dependent on the...

I analyse a group contest in which groups decide over two dimensions of membership-exclusivity: whether a member is allowed to join the group at all, and whether this member is allowed to join another group as well. If the prize is mostly private, group leaders do not offer membership in...

How is group conflict over a public-good prize affected when individuals are active members of multiple groups simultaneously? To investigate this question, I introduce a simple model of Tullock group contest: individuals are partitioned into two groups in two dimensions each, the group-level...