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A simple mechanism for the roommate problem

Evci, Bora - 2014

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem …". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the … implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017

Marriage Formation With Assortative Meeting as a Two-Sided Optimal Stopping Problem

Parilina, Elena - 2013

In this paper, we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with … characteristics. We show that individuals with a higher universal characteristic tend to be more picky in their marriage hunting. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081052

Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market

Bester, Helmut - 2021

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476

Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market

Bester, Helmut - 2021

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091

School Choice : Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms

Jaramillo, Paula - 2017

implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for "sub-implementation …" and "sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955586

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Heller, Christian-Philipp - 2016

We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711

Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets

Echenique, Federico; Pereyra, Juan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 1-39

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673087

Pairing games and markets

Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435

Two Simple Mechanisms to the Marriage Problem

Evci, Bora - 2019

In this paper, we propose two new mechanisms operating in two-sided matching games. The first mechanism implements the …-empty subset of stable matchings such that the outcome set includes (wo)men-optimal stable matching, and there does not exist any … matching which is not a member of the set and better than some matching in the set in view of (wo)men. In addition, we present …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141267

Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bargaining Solutions

Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - 2020

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041039