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Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem …". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the … implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711
Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013488863
structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational … of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284048
-sided matching model to find the reason for the new design. We model the situation as if research centers decided by majority to play …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405550
This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008643839
I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517013
We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms in which hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. We prove that all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibriumoutcomes are stable, but the inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854651
. Comparing the predicted and observed matching patterns, we find that the Gale-Shapley model explains the matches achieved by the … explore whether the estimated mate preferences, in conjunction with the Gale-Shapley algorithm, can explain the matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724797