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Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem …". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the … implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017
In this paper, we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with … characteristics. We show that individuals with a higher universal characteristic tend to be more picky in their marriage hunting. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081052
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for "sub-implementation …" and "sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955586
We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673087
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
In this paper, we propose two new mechanisms operating in two-sided matching games. The first mechanism implements the …-empty subset of stable matchings such that the outcome set includes (wo)men-optimal stable matching, and there does not exist any … matching which is not a member of the set and better than some matching in the set in view of (wo)men. In addition, we present …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141267
We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041039