We investigate the impact of community power on the practice of untouchability in rural India. We model two-dimensional simultaneous group conflict over social norms, wherein an upper and backward (OBC) caste Hindu bloc contests the 'scheduled' castes (SCs) over the extent to which behavioural...

We investigate the impact of community power on the practice of untouchability in rural India. We model two-dimensional simultaneous group conflict over social norms, wherein an upper and backward (OBC) caste Hindu bloc contests the 'scheduled' castes (SCs) over the extent to which behavioural...

We investigate the impact of community power on the practice of untouchability in rural India. We model two-dimensional simultaneous group conflict over social norms, wherein an upper and backward (OBC) caste Hindu bloc contests the ‘scheduled’ castes (SCs) over the extent to which...

We investigate the impact of community power on the practice of untouchability - the avoidance of physical contact – engaged in by upper and intermediate caste (OBC) Hindus vis-à-vis ‘scheduled’ castes (SCs) in rural India. Despite legal prohibition, the practice remains common, limiting...

We examine how within-group inequality, by influencing the group bias of state institutions such as the police and the judiciary, affects the cost-benefit calculus of individuals engaging in identity-assertive behaviour, that results in police complaints regarding hate crimes. We develop a...

We examine how within-group inequality, by influencing the group bias of state institutions, affects the cost-benefit calculus of individuals engaging in identity-assertive behaviour, that results in police complaints regarding hate crimes. We develop a two-stage contest model of between-group...

We examine how group-specific differences in reservation wage, arising due to asymmetries in social entitlements, impact on distribution via the joint determination of class conflict between workers and employers, and ‘ethnic’ conflict among workers. We model a two-dimensional contest, where...

We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical individual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric and concave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles (Econ....