Investor uncertainty about firm value drives investors' information collection and trading activities, as well as managers' disclosure choices. This study examines an important source of uncertainty that likely cannot be influenced by most managers and investors: uncertainty about government...

Prior research finds that intraday stock prices move considerably during the discussion period of earnings conference calls. In this study, we explore what features of the manager-analyst dialogue during the discussion drive these price movements. We textually analyze the tone of managers and...

Theories of delegated monitoring predict that when public disclosure is costly, monitoring by a large investor leads management to supply more private information to that investor, and less public disclosure to other similarly aligned investors who free-ride off the monitor. We test this...

Recent disclosure models predict that firms with more pessimistic private information about future operating performance will make more disaggregated discretionary disclosures. We use the IPO S-1 filing setting to address this question, arguing that this setting closely matches the theory...