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Repeated implementation

Kalai, Ehud; Ledyard, John O. - 1998 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000988686

Repeated implementation

Kalai, Ehud; Ledyard, John O. - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000988688

Repeated implementation

Kalai, Ehud - In: Journal of economic theory 83 (1998) 2, pp. 308-317

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001253759

Design of tradable permit programs under imprecise measurement

Ledyard, John O. - In: Social design : essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz, (pp. 139-156). 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061465

The paradox of voting and candidate competition : a general equilibrium analysis

Ledyard, John O. - In: Essays in contemporary fields of economics : in honor …, (pp. 54-80). 1981

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002373344

The relation of optima and market equilibria with externalities

Ledyard, John O. - In: Journal of economic theory 3 (1971) 1, pp. 54-65

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002373349

The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium

Ledyard, John O. - In: Journal of economic theory 39 (1986) 1, pp. 59-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001014194

Public goods: a survey of experimental research

Ledyard, John O. - 1994 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000886806

Partially-specified large games

Kalai, Ehud (contributor) - 2005

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a diØ culty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More-over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779295

Presidential address

Kalai, Ehud - In: Games and economic behavior 63 (2008) 2, pp. 421-430

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003736893