We analyze a cheap-talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in a finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender sends a message in each period, and the receiver then voluntarily pays money for the...

We consider a multidivision organization’s choice between a decentralized structure and a centralized one. Each division has its own privateinformation and can fully commit to a communication rule. We consider two types of coordination–standardization and diversification. We show that the...

We analyze a cheap talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, in each period, the sender sends a cheap talk message and the receiver voluntarily pays money for the...

This paper analyzes strategic interactions between cheap talk and lie detection and studies the optimal equilibrium for costly lie detection and its effectiveness. An informed sender wants to persuade an uninformed receiver to take high actions, but the receiver wants to match the action with...

We analyze a cheap-talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in a finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender sends a message in each period, and the receiver then voluntarily pays money for the...