We analyze a model of bargaining over new ideas. The model accounts for the problem of information leakage, i.e., the diffusion of information about the idea before and after the idea is implemented. We analyze the effects of information leakage on the distribution of rents within firms and the...

We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product butmust hire employees to bring the product to the market. Information leakage implies that newly hired employees become informed of the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the market themselves. We...

We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product but must hire employees to bring the product to the market. However, newly hired employees learn the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the market themselves. We develop a bargaining model that...

In this paper, we study the incentives of firms to promote innovation. We analyze a situation in which an employee in a firm is inspired with an idea for a new product. In a framework in which intellectual property rights on ideas are imperfect, we analyze the employee's decision of whether to...