This paper models investment/entry decisions in a competitive industry that is subject to a quantity control on an input for production. The quantity control is implemented by auctioning licenses for the restricted input (e.g., a pollution permit or a production license). The paper shows that...

This paper considers the effects of trade policy-tariffs and quotas-when importing is done by competitive traders who are identical ex ante but differ ex post. We show that the standard equivalence results no longer hold and the conventional ranking of tariffs and quotas is turned on its head:...

This paper considers the effects of trade policy - tariffs and quotas - when importing is done by competitive traders who are identical ex ante but differ ex post. We show that the standard equivalence results no longer hold and the conventional ranking of tariffs and quotas is turned on its...

This paper examines the role of middlemen (brokers) in an imperfect secondary market for quota licenses. Middlemen facilitate trade when markets are thin, as potential buyers and sellers find it difficult to meet and transact directly. However, in thin markets, middlemen also have the ability to...

This paper considers the effects of trade policy--tariffs and quotas--when importing is done by competitive traders who are identical ex ante but differ ex post. We show that the standard equivalence results no longer hold and the conventional ranking of tariffs and quotas is turned on its head:...

Available estimates of tariff equivalents of quotas and welfare calculations on the costs of MFA quotas for developing countries are based on the premise of perfect competition in both product and license markets. It is also assumed that the exporting countries which administer the MFA quotas...

This paper models investment/entry decisions in a competitive industry that is subject to a quantity control on an input for production. The quantity control is implemented by auctioning licenses for the restricted input. The paper shows that liberalizing the quantity control could reduce...

This paper questions the presumption that transferable quota licenses are worth more and result in higher welfare. We show that the price of a transferable license will tend to be higher than that of its nontransferable counterpart only if the underlying quota is quite restrictive. Despite this,...

In the first of the two companion papers, we show that the dynamic aspects of the license utilization decision in an uncertain environment, together with the usual policy of rewarding high license utilization with future license allocations. creates four components of the license price. These...

Available estimates of tariff equivalents of quotas and welfare calculations on the costs of MFA quotas for developing countries are based on the premise of perfect competition in both product and license markets. It is also assumed that the exporting countries which administer the MFA quotas...