We provide a bridge between the voluntary disclosure and the earnings management literature. Voluntary disclosure models focus on managers' discretion in deciding whether or not to provide truthful voluntary disclosure to the capital market. Earnings management models, on the other hand,...

Although an organization's environmental uncertainty may induce greater variability in reported earnings, managers have incentives to reduce this variability. The flexibility accorded by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) provides managers the means to accomplish this via exercising...

We document that the quality of public and private information available to investors improves before seasoned equity offerings (SEO) but deteriorates shortly thereafter. As firms improve their financial communication, analyst earnings forecasts become more accurate and less biased. However,...

This study examines former Arthur Andersen clients and provides evidence on the factors involved in their selection of new auditors after Andersen's collapse. Using a unique dataset which identifies whether or not former Andersen clients followed their audit team to a new auditor, findings...

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate...

We explore how the readability of annual reports varies with earnings management. Using the Fog Index to measure readability (Li 2008), and focusing on the management discussion and analysis section of the annual report (MD&A), we predict and find that firms most likely to have managed earnings...

In this paper we study the bias a manager introduces into reports of firm performance when the market is uncertain about the manager's objectives. Comparative static results suggest that the information content of the manager's report falls as the cost of biasing reports falls, or uncertainty...

We study an extension of a two-period inventory management problem with positively correlated demands in which the manager's compensation is partially based on an external, market-based assessment of the firm's value. As typically the "real'' demand is only observed internally in the firm, the...

Firms enjoy a wide degree of discretion in their disclosure of events in the patent granting process, which investors generally view as "good news" announcements. This study examines the timing of patent disclosure in conjunction with earnings announcements in light of managers' incentives to...

We examine a model that incorporates two hidden-actions of the manager: a productive effort and a manipulative effort. The manager is paid a bonus based on the accounting report that the manager can manipulate. A downward restatement of the accounting report triggers lawsuits. The manager is...