Several recent empirical papers assert that the decision to disclose an earnings forecast shortly before the actual earnings announcement reveals only short-term information and is therefore unlikely to entail proprietary costs. Using a simple dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, we show that...

This paper shows that past disclosure decisions cause the current disclosure decision using a Bayesian hierarchical model that flexibly accounts for firm economic characteristics that may explain persistence in disclosure decisions. A management forecast in the prior quarter, relative to its...

We study whether and how creditors exercise their control rights to shape their borrowers’ executive compensation plans. Highly levered borrowers often face incentives to underinvest due to agency conflicts driven by differences in time horizon and risk-taking preferences between managers and...

The countervailing effect of MiFID II’s unbundling provision, which requires brokerages to separate research costs from trading execution costs, on the capital market has led to controversies about its efficacy and its potential rollback. In this paper, we examine the role of firms’...

Theory posits that investors can rationally infer the implications of strategic nondisclosure for firm value, pressuring managers to disclose information voluntarily. This study documents that the lack of an earnings guidance predicts an abnormal return of -41 basis points around the subsequent...

This paper documents a dual role for disclosure. In addition to the traditional role of alleviating information asymmetry, firms are motivated to disclose to attract limited investor resources and order flow away from other firms (Fishman and Hagerty, 1989). Higher competition for investors...