Assuming benevolent managers, the debt-overhang problem suggests that distressed firms generally refrain from issuing equity. In contrast, agency theory predicts that distressed firm managers have strong self-interests to finance even deteriorating projects through equity issuance. This paper...

Using a sample of 1,593 US firms that go public between 1990 and 2007, we find that VC-backed IPOs experience less financial distress risk post-offering than do comparable non-VC-backed IPOs. After controlling for endogeneity, we find this is related to the screening done by VC-investors, who...

A personal bankruptcy law that allows for a "fresh start" after bankruptcy reduces the individual risk involved in entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, as risk shifts to creditors who recover less of their credit after a debtor's bankruptcy, lenders may charge higher interest rates or...

PurposeThis paper aims to study the effect of the establishment of bankruptcy courts on bond issuance market. This paper helps to predict that the introduction of bankruptcy courts in China can mitigate price distortions caused by the implicit government guarantees and promote the development of...

Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides firms with broad latitude to reject certain executory contracts, which are contracts whose terms have not been fully executed. We focus on the impact of this feature of the Bankruptcy Code by examining one of the most common executory contracts, operating leases....

This paper examines the use of key employee retention and incentive plans (KERPs) in bankrupt firms. We find that firms in Chapter 11 are more likely to offer KERPs when firms are located in thicker employment markets, when creditors have strong control, and when bankrupt firms have complex...