This paper examines the relation between information's properties, such as reliability and relevance, and public disclosure policy. It shows that the optimal accounting system often involves a carefully balanced combination of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, with mandatory reporting focused...

We study firms' voluntary disclosures in a world of potential information leaks. We find that managers adapt their disclosure strategy to the likelihood and expected scope of leaks. An increasing likelihood fosters voluntary disclosure if leaks merely expose the manager's information endowment...

The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where...

We examine whether managers convey more information via voluntary disclosure channels when standard-setters limit managers' discretion in GAAP. We estimate the extent to which standard setters limit managers' discretion by counting the number of times obligatory modal verbs are mentioned in the...

We employ a quasi-natural experiment to examine the effect of investor inattention on firms' voluntary disclosure. While prior research focuses on when managers make mandatory disclosures within a given quarter, we examine whether investor inattention influences what managers voluntarily...

In this paper, I examine the impact of ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty), alongside that of risk, on firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions. I confirm the well-known result that an increase in risk— uncertainty over outcomes—is associated with an increase in management guidance (earnings...

We develop a model in which the principal and the agent share private information about the value of the agent for a multi-agent organization. The principal can disclose private information and make public the relative standing or status of all agents in the organization. We study whether it is...

We consider a standard persuasion problem in which the receiver’s action and the state of the world are both one-dimensional. Fully characterizing optimal signals when utilities are non-linear is a daunting task. Instead, we develop a general approach to understanding a key qualitative...

Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of informationwhich is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model inwhich the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term informationwhich becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficientlylow, the manager discloses...

I study how voluntary disclosure of information affects outcomes in plea bargaining. A prosecutor negotiates a sentence with a defendant who privately knows whether he is guilty or innocent. The prosecutor can gather evidence regarding the defendant's type during negotiations, and a trial...