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-trivial unawareness among several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366550
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
, subsequently, takes an action that determines the utility of both. We assume full rationality, a certain degree of alignment of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191052
explicit the role of knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payoff functions. For this purpose, we use an … bound order of mutual knowledge of rationality. This result implies that under common knowledge of rationality, the … desired coordination of actions even when a high order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059114
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853
characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702628
extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673255
We define a cautious version of extensive-form rationalizability for generalized extensive- form games with unawareness that we call prudent rationalizability. It is an extensive-form analogue of iterated admissibility. In each round of the procedure, for each tree and each information set of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012101418
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153832
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009259934