We consider dynamic oligopoly models in the spirit of Ericson and Pakes (1995). We introduce a new computationally tractable model for industries with a few dominant firms and many fringe firms, in which firms keep track of the detailed state of dominant firms and of few moments of the...

Motivated by the proliferation of user-generated product-review information and its widespreaduse, this note studies a market where consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their willingness-to-pay for a new product. Each consumer observes the binary reviews (like or dislike) of consumers who...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

This thesis addresses a problem at the nexus of engineering, computer science, and economics: in large scale, decentralized systems, how can we efficiently allocate scarce resources among competing interests? On one hand, constraints are imposed on the system designer by the inherent...