This paper provides evidence on how the new international regulation on Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) impacts the market value of large banks. We analyze the stock price reactions for the 300 largest banks from 52 countries across 12 relevant regulatory announcement and...

Global systemically important banks (GSIBs) are subject to capital surcharges that increase with systemic importance indicators. We show that U.S. GSIBs lower their surcharges to a large extent by reducing one indicator---the notional amount of over-the-counter derivatives---in the fourth...

We examine the assertion that ratings from the ratings agencies that explicitly assume governmental support for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) translate into lower spreads and a funding cost advantage for those G-SIBs. We analyze whether the market over the past 14 years in fact...

The paper examines the basic rationale and features of the proposals adopted to separate specific investment and commercial banking activities (Volcker rule, Vickers and Liikanen proposals). In particular, it focuses on the likely implications of such initiatives for: (i) financial stability and...

Market risk reporting in banking has assumed such importance during the last decade. The purpose of this paper is to provide a methodology to evaluate the qualitative and quantitative profiles of the market risk disclosure in banking. We propose a hybrid methodology to assess whether or not...

After the destructive impact of the global financial crisis of 2008, many believe that pre-crisis financial market regulation did not take the "big picture" of the system suffciently into account and, subsequently, financial supervision mainly "missed the forest for the trees". As a result, the...

This paper studies the systemic risk contribution of a set of large publicly traded European banks. Over a sample covering the last twenty years and three di!erent crises, we "nd that all banks in our sample signi"cantly contribute to systemic risk. Moreover, larger banks and banks with a...

We quantify the gains from regulating banks' maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors’ preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...