We analyze how termination charges a ect retail prices when taking into account that receivers derive some utility from a call and when rms may charge consumers for receiving calls. A novel feature of our paper is that we consider passive self-ful lling expectations and do not allow for negative...

European and the US mobile communication services markets have developed in rather different ways. There are striking differences in termination regulation and retail pricing models and one may wonder why this occurred and whether either of the markets outperforms the other in terms of...

We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externalities arise when firms discriminate between on- and off-net calls or when subscription demand is elastic. This literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases in...

This paper analyzes how the implementation of the Receiver Party Pays regime affects networks operators' pricing strategies in a model of dynamic competition. We characterize the equilibrium and provide sufficient conditions under which it exists and is unique. We show that in equilibrium...

This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase...

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, the high interconnection of financial institutions makes the (implicitly or explicitly) promise of no intervention made by governments barely credible. Moreover, it is largely claimed that these...

Previous research has argued that telecommunications networks under nonlinear pricing cannot use reciprocal access charges as an instrument of collusion as long as the market is mature and there is either full participation or an exogenous participation rate. This paper shows that (even...

This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a...

We study the impact of electricity divestments in a stylised model where a dominant producer faces a competitive fringe with the same cost structure and is forced to sell some of its capacity. For a given demand level, the divestment which achieves the greatest reduction in prices can be several...

This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a...