In dynamic environments, Q-learning is an adaptative rule that provides an estimate (a Q-value) of the continuation value associated with each alternative. A naive policy consists in always choosing the alternative with highest Q-value. We consider a family of Q-based policy rules that may...

The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by...

This paper examines the implications for equilibrium price of a shift in demand and also provides formal characterizations in a general dynamic model of perfect equilibrium, the relation between dominated and dominant strategies, the relation between reversion and generalized reversion strategy...

A nonstandard counterpart to the results of Allen and Hellwig (1986) on the convergence of a Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium arising out of price setting by firms operating under capacity constraint into a Walrasian (or competitive) equilibrium is presented and analyzed

We consider a model of monopolistic competition with several heterogeneous sectors and endogenous labor supply. For low (high) values of the labor supply elasticity, we show that there is always a unique equilibrium. For medium values of the labor supply elasticity, the set of equilibria (if...

In this paper we study the configuration dynamics and the societal equilibrium selection of repeated lattice games. Each player plays games only with his immediate neighbors hence indirectly interacts with everyone else. A player may or may not have perfect control over his action. Different...

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

We examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response. This concept implies, but is not implied by Radner's ex ante perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile is a...

This paper examines sequential equilibria of repeated games with private monitoring where signals are generally distributed. Assuming full dimensionality of payoffs and identifiability conditions of signals, we focus on games with finite stage-game actions and signals. We can construct a...