Placing a tattoo is a choice with potentially significant and long-lasting social and economic consequences. In this study we look at the factors determining the decision to place a tattoo and combine this with several outcomes, such as income and employment status, living together with a...

We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides first and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before deciding whether or not to contribute. Without...

Does adverse selection hamper the effectiveness of voluntary risk sharing? How do differences in risk profiles affect adverse selection? We experimentally investigate individuals' willingness to share risks with others. Across treatments we vary how risk profiles differ between individuals. We...

Redistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes and economic experiments have revealed that most people have a preference for redistribution that is not merely inspired by self-interest. Interestingly, little is known on how these preferences interact with preferences for...

Redistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes. It is still largely an open question what people‘s preferences are regarding redistribution - both through pensions schemes as well as more generally. It would seem that economists have little to say about this question, as...

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information.The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...

This Discussion paper has been substantially revised, and is now available under the title "Why do promises affect trustworthiness, or do they?" in Experimental Economics, June 2016, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 382–393; http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10683-015-9444-1 We set out to test...

We employ a price setting duopoly experiment to examine whether buyer confusion increases market prices. Each seller offers a good to buyers who have homogeneous preferences. Sellers decide on the number of attributes of their good and set prices. The number of attributes bears no cost to the...

Lobbying is studied in a series of signaling game experiments. Students as well as professional lobbyists are used as subjects. In contrast with some earlier studies, comparing students and professionals, we find significant differences in the behavior of the two subject pools. Professional...

On an increasing scale auctions are used to allocate the licenses to operate on markets which are thought not suited for free entry. According to standard economic arguments, the license fees paid at the auction will not affect consumer prices since they constitute a sunk cost. This standard...