We study an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple families in which redistributional transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Supporting the old is a purely inter-generational (intra-family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an...

Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominance-solvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly...

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense...

We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the true value of the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves, two contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed donors contribute simultaneously or the...

We give an account of an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple families in which voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Support to the old is a purely intergenerational (intra-family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an...

The effectiveness of relative performance evaluation schemes, such as yardstick competition, can be undermined by collusion. The degree to which the regulated agents manage to collude will be affected by the particulars of the scheme. We hypothesize that in a repeated game setting schemes will...

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...

We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free-form pre-play message for the trustor. The main twist in our design is that there is a 50% probability that the message is delivered to the trustor and a 50% probability that the message is replaced by an empty sheet. We find that...

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informed sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder. We compare the behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs officials that are professionally...

A well-documented anomaly in racetrack betting is that the expected return per dollar bet on a horse increases with the probability of the horse winning. This so-called favorite- longshot bias is at odds with the presumptions of market efficiency. We show that the bias is consistent with betters...