The theoretical literature of industrial organization shows that the distances between consumers and firms have first-order implications for competitive outcomes whenever transportation costs are large. To assess these effects empirically, we develop a structural model of competition among...

We use Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate whether "upward pricing pressure" (UPP) accurately predicts the price effects of mergers, motivated by the observation that UPP is a restricted form of the first order approximation derived in Jaffe and Weyl (2013). Results indicate that UPP is quite...

We examine how forward contracts affect economic outcomes under generalized market structures. In the model, forward contracts discipline the exercise of market power by making profit less sensitive to changes in output. This impact is greatest in markets with intermediate levels of...

We analyze the accuracy of first order approximation, a method developed theoretically in Jaffe and Weyl (2012) for predicting the price effects of mergers, and provide an empirical application. Approximation is an alternative to the model-based simulations commonly employed in industrial...

We demonstrate that cost pass-through can be used to inform demand calibration, potentially eliminating the need for data on margins, diversion, or both. We derive the relationship between cost pass-through and consumer demand using a general oligopoly model of Nash-Bertrand competition and...

We develop a stylized model of a Schumpeterian industry, characterized by cumulative innovation and a succession of incumbent monopolists, to address issues in competition policy toward abuse of dominance. Incumbents' R&D investments increase future social surplus flows as well as the...

We analyze mergers and entry in a differentiated products oligopoly model of price competition. Any merger that does not yield efficiencies is unprofitable if it induces entry sufficient to preserve pre-merger consumer surplus. Thus, mergers occur in equilibrium only if barriers limit entry....

Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying...