The theoretical literature of industrial organization shows that the distances between consumers and firms have first-order implications for competitive outcomes whenever transportation costs are large. To assess these effects empirically, we develop a structural model of competition among...

We model competition between two firms in a vertical upstream-downstream relationship. Each firm can pay a sunk cost to enter the other's market. For equilibria in which both firms enter, the downstream price can be lower than the joint profit maximizing level, and coordination (e.g., through...

We provide a methodology to simulate the coordinated effects of a proposed merger using data commonly available to antitrust authorities. The model follows the price leadership structure in Miller, Sheu, and Weinberg (2021) in an environment with logit or nested logit demand. The model...

This Article examines the normative challenges posed by bringing international human rights claims in state courts under the common law of torts. It argues that the normative structure of the private law of torts cannot adequately address the very different concerns at stake when addressing...

We examine how forward contracts affect economic outcomes under generalized market structures. In the model, forward contracts discipline the exercise of market power by making profit less sensitive to changes in output. This impact is greatest in markets with intermediate levels of...

The theoretical literature of industrial organization shows that the distances between consumers and firms have first-order implications for competitive outcomes whenever transportation costs are large. To assess these effects empirically, we develop a structural model of competition among...

We analyze the accuracy of first order approximation, a method developed theoretically in Jaffe and Weyl (2012) for predicting the price effects of mergers, and provide an empirical application. Approximation is an alternative to the model-based simulations commonly employed in industrial...

We demonstrate that cost pass-through can be used to inform demand calibration, potentially eliminating the need for data on margins, diversion, or both. We derive the relationship between cost pass-through and consumer demand using a general oligopoly model of Nash-Bertrand competition and...

We develop a stylized model of a Schumpeterian industry, characterized by cumulative innovation and a succession of incumbent monopolists, to address issues in competition policy toward abuse of dominance. Incumbents' R&D investments increase future social surplus flows as well as the...