Similar Search Results

Heller, Yuval - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 2, pp. 394-400

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657365

Heller, Yuval - 2011

A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria have been defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205603

Duffy, John - 2008

We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically, we seek to understand the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723772

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case

Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise - 2011

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …. -- Bayesian game ; cheap talk ; communication equilibrium ; correlated equilibrium ; pre-play communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010498

Cheap Talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing in Joint Projects

Agastya, Murali; Menezes, Flávio Marques; Sengupta, Kunal - 2003

, absent prior discussions, the project is never undertaken. However, with a prior stage of communication, all ex-ante and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014030120

Moulin, Hervé; Ray, Indrajit; Gupta, Sonali Sen - 2014

We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462720

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672033

Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution

Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002071407

Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure

Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014

The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of … analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is … disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867

Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution

Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004

nodes in a communication network. However, communication through the network is noisy, which removes common knowledge about …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156