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Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
Heller, Yuval - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 2, pp. 394-400
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657365
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All-Stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium
Heller, Yuval - 2011
A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria have been defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205603
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A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - 1997
We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060837
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case
Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise - 2011
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …. -- Bayesian game ; cheap talk ; communication equilibrium ; correlated equilibrium ; pre-play communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010498
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Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : The Two-Player Case
Vida, Peter - 2011
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128960
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case
Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 1, pp. 95-123
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687076
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Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure
Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of … analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is … disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867
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Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution
Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002071407
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Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution
Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004
nodes in a communication network. However, communication through the network is noisy, which removes common knowledge about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
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Corrigendum to 'Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions'
de Castro, Luciano I. - 2006
This is a corrigendum to Theorem 15 of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) [Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions, Econometrica, 73, 93-140], which proves the existence of equilibrium with positive probability of trade for private value auctions
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779627