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Lagunoff, Roger; Gerardi, Dino; Anderlini, Luca - Georgetown University, Department of Economics - 2008

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169616

" Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' "

Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2001

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407603

A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Georgetown University, Department of Economics - 2006

conditions, when players are sufficiently patient, all feasible payoff vectors (including those below the minmax of the stage … applies to any stage game for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoff set with a non-empty interior. We are also able … to characterize entirely when a Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoff vector not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005396413

Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?

Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 1999

to an arbitrary degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550877

"Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games"

Lagunoff, Roger; Haller, Hans - EconWPA - 1997

payoff-relevant state variables. Our main result is that the number of Markov Perfect equilibria is generically finite with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550884

Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games

Haller, Hans; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 1999

This paper examines Markov Perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550934

Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism

Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 2001

This paper studies the role of memory and communication in games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the same preferences and faces the same strategic possibilities. Entry across distinct organizations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550938

The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2004

predecessors. Under very mild conditions, when players are sufficiently patient, all feasible payoff vectors (including those below … result applies to any stage game for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoff set with a non-empty interior. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118531

"Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games"

Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 1997

unique perfect equilibrium payoff which Pareto dominates all other payoffs. The result generalizes to any finite number of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118607

Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Georgetown University, Department of Economics - 2014

We study the relative performance of disclosure and auditing in organizations. We consider the information transmission problem between two decision makers who take actions at dates 1 and 2 respectively. The first decision maker has private information about a state of nature that is relevant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938656