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When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime : Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Mailath, George J. - 2004

In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012737863

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J. - 2001

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012742460

The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Mailath, George J. - 2001

We describe the maximum efficient subgame perfect equiligrium payoff for a player in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma …, individually rational payoff profile can be sustained. For an open and dense subset of discount factors below the critical value …, the maximum efficient payoff is not an equilibrium payoff. When a player cannot achieve this payoff, the unique …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012742463

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008) 3, pp. 515-528

perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085600

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150201

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version

Mailath, George J.; : Wojciech Olszewski - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008

A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150206

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006

perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150217

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

the successor's payoff. This value may arise from altruism, but the player also receives such a value if he can “sell” his …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650273

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version

Mailath, George J.; Olszewski, Wojciech - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008

We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494290

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124002