This paper analyzes how financial constraints affect equilibrium payoffs and behaviors in repeated Cournot games. Modifying minmax and feasible payoffs, we derive the folk theorem under financial constraints. Our theorem illustrates that introducing financial constraints shrinks the set of...

This paper examines strategic investment in the context of a duopolistic continuous-time real options game. Our contribution is twofold, economic and methodological. The former is the recognition that, under fixed costs of investment and time-to-build, the firm pays a fraction of the implicit...

We study a new real options model of oligopolistic entry based on empirical evidence of demand for a new product growing over time and eventually falling. Yet, firms do not know ex ante when this can occur, which creates incentives to update information by delaying irreversible entry. By...

This paper investigates strategic investment policies in a duopolistic continuous-time real options game. Our contribution is twofold, economic and methodological. The former is the recognition that, under fixed costs of investment and time-to-build, a firm's exercise of its capital-replacement...

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on...

The investment boundaries defined by Grenadier (2002) for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open loop strategies. As closed loop strategies, they are not equilibria, because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth...

In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...

While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how the shadow of the future affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental...

We investigate truth-telling by an informed insider, or manager, who repeatedly forecasts cash flows to competitive investors in a standard message game. The insider may not trade on or sell private information, but receives wages that can depend on the current stock price or forecast accuracy....