We study horizontal partial acquisitions in an oligopolistic industry in the absence of synergies. Contrary to existing results, we find that a dominant shareholder may choose to acquire shares in a competitor although the aggregate profit of the group of firms under his control, and even the...

In this general equilibrium model, justice and police institutions are treated as a mechanism that induces individuals to extend some desirable productive effort. This determines individual encroachment activities which in turn determine the proportion of aggregate production that fails to be...

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...

In order to choose the proper size of an infrastructure and to save as much as possible on investment costs, it is necessary for the responsible party (the Centre in the language of this report) to have access to information that is typically known only by some agents or partners who may use...