This paper is concerned with the incentive properties of the Matthew Effect by which since Merton [1968] one is usually describing the various cumulative advantages that obviously affect academic competition. We introduce a model of sequential contests in which the agents that have initially...

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...

We study the development of a duopoly industry -evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior- in a continuous-time real-options model of capacity investment. Our methodology allows the evaluation of investment options and exercise rules in a strategic setup. In the initial industry...

We study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous Bertrand competition in a stochastically growing market. Different patterns of equilibria may arise, depending on the importance of the real option effect. If the average growth rate of the market is close...

In the 1970s, Thomas C. Schelling proposed a model which claimed to show that a high degree of spatial segregation can result from individual preferences which do not in themselves aim to achieve such a degree of collective segregation. A perverse effect seems therefore to occur. However, the...

An ambiguous statistical experiment is a set of joint probability distributions over states and signals. This note compares ambiguous experiments from the point of view of an ambiguity averse decision maker and extends the Blackwell (1951, 1953) ordering to this setting

French Abstract: Nous introduisons un modèle stratégique de négociations à deux joueurs avec des preferences dans le risque de type utilité non-espérée. Nous définissons la notion de prime de risque de désaccord, un analogue séquentiel du concept d'audace, afin de prendre en compte le...

We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al.(2001), our design keeps the relative riskiness of the two strategies at a constant level as the optimisation premium is increased. Furthermore, we also test the effect of a decrease of the relative...

This paper is an attempt to analyze regulation in LDCs taking into account their specificities compared to developed countries. By using a regulation model with an imperfect contract enforcement mechanism, we show how the separation of powers improves the enforcement quality and social welfare...

Several online market sites, such as eBay, have implemented reputation management mechanisms in order to improve cooperation. In this article, we aim at investigating the emergence of trust and cooperation in presence of reputation mechanism. In a series of experiments based on the trust game...