We compare the optimal trading strategy of an informed speculator when he can trade ahead of incoming news (is "fast"), versus when he cannot (is "slow"). We find that speed matters: the fast speculator's trades account for a larger fraction of trading volume, and are more correlated with...

French Abstract: Quelles sont les conséquences en matière de bien-être d'une meilleure diffusion de l'information financière parmi les spéculateurs? Pour traiter cette question, nous considérons un marché où des agents non informés échangent pour un motif de partage de risque avec des...

We study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We focus on the one sided case and perform a dynamic analysis of a constant entry flow model. The same question has been studied in an identical framework in Serrano and Yosha (1993) but they limit their analysis to the...

We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces a (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to stop experimenting with the risky arm. The equilibrium amount of experimentation depends on the degree to which experimentation outcomes are...