In this paper, transaction costs in the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) are examined empirically based on survey data from German companies. Transaction costs from measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions, permit trading and general informational costs are considered....

In this paper we empirically compare the transaction costs from monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of two environmental regulations directed to cost-efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions: a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax and a tradable emissions system. We do this in the case of...

In this paper we empirically compare the transaction costs from monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of two environmental regulations directed to cost-efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions: a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax and a tradable emissions system. We do this in the case of...

We investigate the long-run impact of environmental regulations on the intra-industry distribution of firm-level productivity and the resulting aggregate variables. In a general-equilibrium model that accounts for endogenous entry/exit of heterogeneous firms, neither the average productivity of...

Design of environmental regulation has substantial implications for size distribution and mass of firms within and across industries in the long run. In a general equilibrium model that accounts for endogenous entry and exit of heterogeneous firms, the welfare impacts of emissions trading are...

In international emissions trading schemes such as the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the suboptimal negotiation of the cap with respect to total pollution minimization leads us to critically examine the proposition that generous allocation of grandfathered...

This paper examines the operation of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) in a Cournot oligopoly.  We study the impact of the ETS on industry output, price, costs, emissions, and profits.  In particular, we develop formulae for the number of emissions permits that have to be freely allocated to...

This paper examines the amount of grandfathering needed for an emissions trading scheme (ETS) to have a neutral impact on firm profits. We provide a simple formula to calculate profit-neutral grandfathering in a Cournot model with firms of different sizes and a general demand function. Using...

In this paper we examine the impacts of transaction costs on enforcing a transferable emissions permit system. We derive an enforcement strategy with a self-reporting requirement that achieves complete compliance in a cost-effective manner. In the absence of transaction costs targeted...

This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for pollution control. A firm’s decision to be compliant or not is independent of its manager’s risk preference. However, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations than otherwise...