The economic success of China and India is looked upon with admiration but also concern about the effects that the growth of these Asian economies may have on the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region’s manufacturing and services sectors. The evidence summarized here indicates that certain...

Policy making power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political and...

A rationale for cooperation in trade negotiations is the internalization of terms-of-trade externalities. With the help of a simple theoretical framework we show that the textbook prediction that non-cooperative tariffs are positively correlated to the importer's market power is reversed when...

The recent theoretical literature on the determinants of trade agreements has stressed the importance of political gains, such as credibility, as a rationale for trade agreements. The empirical literature, however, has lagged behind in the estimation of the economic gains or losses associated...

This Paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American countries. The basic framework is one developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff...

The theoretical literature follows two different approaches to explain the endogenous formation of a Customs Union (CU). The first one explains CU formation through the willingness of integrating partners to exploit terms-of-trade effects. Indeed, as the union forms, the 'domestic market' gets...

Using the influence-driven approach to endogenous trade-policy determination, we show how a free-trade agreement (FTA) with rules of origin can work as a device to compensate losers from trade liberalization. The FTA constructed in this paper is characterized by external tariff structures that...

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical...

This paper confronts the results of the endogenous tariff literature with MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Sur, literally, ‘the Common Market of the Southern Cone’) evidence. It is shown that MERCOSUR’s common external tariff (CET), and member countries’ deviations from the CET and from...

This paper explores how political-economy forces shape quantitative barriers against the rest of the world in a FTA. We show that whereas the dilution of lobbying power in a FTA typically leads to a relaxation of external quotas, this result is likely to be overturned as integration deepens. In...