Showing 1 - 8 of 8
In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247843
We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823881
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823926
In microeconomic analysis functions with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) have frequently been employed. Various properties of increasing quasiconcave aggregator functions with DRS are derived. Furthermore duality in the classical sense as well as of a new type is studied for such aggregator...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823934
This paper evaluates the forecasting performance of a continuous stochastic volatility model with two factors of volatility (SV2F) and compares it to those of GARCH and ARFIMA models. The empirical results show that the volatility forecasting ability of the SV2F model is better than that of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582598
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barber?Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582717
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572173
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210