Showing 1 - 10 of 16
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barber?Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582717
characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210
The chosen tournament format has a fundamental impact on the popularity and success of a sport. Efficiency of a format describes how well it can reproduce the real but hidden power ranking of the participants. We compare the efficiency of the formats of two individual sports that share similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290300
The chosen tournament format has a fundamental impact on the popularity and success of a sport. Efficiency of a format describes how well it can reproduce the real but hidden power ranking of the participants. We compare the efficiency of the formats of two individual sports that share similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012125547
A high court has to decide whether a law is constitutional, un- constitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is … runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for … universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social choice functions. Although in our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008691150
We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who the w best contestants are, but they may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008486378
We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one di¤erent agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008486381
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the … or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494447
One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts … Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the average size of the voting districts, require voting districts not to … term: increase the number of voting districts to about 130, allow the number of voting districts to change flexibly at each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494515
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the … or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We … illustrate the use of this model on examples from Hungary. -- weighted voting ; Hungarian National Assembly ; absent voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668694