Showing 1 - 9 of 9
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the … or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494447
One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts … Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the average size of the voting districts, require voting districts not to … and using our efficient algorithm and the data of the 2010 national elections we determine the optimal apportionment. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494515
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the … or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We … illustrate the use of this model on examples from Hungary. -- weighted voting ; Hungarian National Assembly ; absent voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668694
One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts … Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the average size of the voting districts, require voting districts not to … and using our efficient algorithm and the data of the 2010 national elections we determine the optimal apportionment. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009628411
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342190
We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823881
We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772164
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barber?Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582717
characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210